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War Powers, Foreign Affairs,
and the Courts: Some
Institutional Considerations
Jonathan L. Entin *
As other contributions to this symposium make clear, much
of the debate over presidential power in foreign affairs has
focused on the dynamics of policy-making within the executive
branch and about the relationship between the executive branch
and Congress. Strikingly absent from the discussion has been the
role of the judiciary. The courts have not been entirely silent,
but they have played a diminished role in this area. Although it
might very well be “the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is,” 1 courts generally have not
played, nor are they likely to play, a significant role in resolving
the debate over the roles of Congress and the president in war
and foreign affairs. Getting courts to address those issues
requires overcoming various procedural and jurisdictional
obstacles. If those challenges are surmounted, courts generally
have shown considerable deference to the executive on the
merits of these disputes even when ruling against the president’s
position. This essay concludes, somewhat tentatively, that a
modest judicial role in this area probably is desirable because
this leaves resolution of interbranch conflicts to the political
process.
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I.

Procedural and Jurisdictional Barriers to
Judicial Review

To be sure, the Supreme Court has decided some well-known
national security cases. Among them are the Steel Seizure case,
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer; 2 the Pentagon Papers case,
New York Times Co. v. United States; 3 the Iranian hostage case,
Dames & Moore v. Regan; 4 and some notable First Amendment cases
arising out of World War I, such as Schenck v. United States 5 and
Abrams v. United States. 6 Then there are the Japanese internment
decisions during World War II, notably Korematsu v. United States,7
as well as Ex parte Quirin, 8 which upheld the use of military
commissions to try German agents who landed in the United States as
part of a sabotage mission. Most recently, the Supreme Court has
addressed questions arising from the government’s response to the
attacks of September 11, 2001, in such cases as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 9
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 10 and Boumediene v. Bush. 11 These cases do
matter, but they have not clearly resolved the constitutional and
other legal issues that pervade the debate about presidential power
and foreign affairs.
Beyond the limitations of the Supreme Court rulings, the
judiciary probably will not contribute very much to the debate.
Various procedural and jurisdictional obstacles make it difficult for
courts to address the merits of disputes about war powers and foreign
affairs. Even if those obstacles can be surmounted, those who decry
what they view as presidential excess should note that the judiciary
typically has taken a deferential role in reviewing challenges to
executive action.
A.

Standing

Because the judicial power of the United States encompasses only
cases and controversies, 12 neither Congress nor the president could
2.

343 U.S. 579 (1952).

3.

403 U.S. 713 (1971).

4.

453 U.S. 654 (1981).

5.

249 U.S. 47 (1919).

6.

250 U.S. 616 (1919).

7.

323 U.S. 214 (1944).

8.

317 U.S. 1 (1942).

9.

542 U.S. 507 (2004).

10.

548 U.S. 557 (2006).

11.

553 U.S. 723 (2008).

12.

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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obtain an advisory opinion about war powers or foreign affairs, even if
they were so inclined. To satisfy the requirement of standing, an
appropriate plaintiff must allege a legally cognizable injury that was
caused by the defendant and could be redressed by a suitable judicial
remedy. 13
Most citizens will lack standing to challenge military actions or
foreign policy decisions because they would be asserting a generalized
grievance. This was the basis for rejecting a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Vietnam War. The plaintiffs in Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War14 claimed that members of
Congress who were members of the military reserve were susceptible
to undue influence by the executive branch, but the Supreme Court
never reached the merits. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because they were asserting “an interest shared by all
citizens.” 15
Although most citizens would be foreclosed from suing, perhaps a
member or group of members of Congress might have standing.
Legislators might try to assert that executive actions infringed their
constitutional authority. This possibility seems to have been
foreclosed by Raines v. Byrd, 16 which held that individual members of
Congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Line
Item Veto Act. 17 The challengers, four Senators and two
Representatives, 18 could not and did not allege that their votes
against the measure had been “completely nullified”; 19 they opposed
the bill and “simply lost.” 20 Accordingly, these individual legislators
lacked standing. 21
13.

See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992);
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Valley Forge Christian
College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26, 38, 41–42 (1976).

14.

418 U.S. 208 (1974).

15.

Id. at 217. Lower courts also rejected legal challenges to the Vietnam
War on standing grounds. See, e.g., Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th
Cir. 1969); Campen v. Nixon, 56 F.R.D. 404 (N.D. Cal. 1972).

16.

521 U.S. 811 (1997).

17.

Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996). Raines did not address the
standing of either house or both houses of Congress to challenge
executive action, holding only that individual members generally do not
have standing. There is reason to believe that the House or Senate could
have standing to challenge executive action. See infra notes 28–29 and
accompanying text.

18.

Raines, 521 U.S. at 814.

19.

Id. at 823.

20.

Id. at 824. The Senators and Representatives also could not establish
standing on the theory that they had been “singled out for specially
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This reasoning suggests that congressional opponents of
presidential military and foreign policy initiatives would lack standing
to sue unless they could claim that their votes “would have been
sufficient to defeat (or enact)” legislation blocking executive action.22
Even that kind of showing might not suffice, however. A challenge to
President Clinton’s decision to participate in the NATO operations in
the former Yugoslavia foundered because the congressional plaintiffs
in Campbell v. Clinton23 lacked standing. The U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia recognized that the more than two dozen
congressional plaintiffs alleged that they had sufficient votes to defeat
a resolution authorizing the president to conduct air strikes in
Yugoslavia and also to defeat a declaration of war; both measures in
fact were defeated, but the military action went ahead anyway.24
Nevertheless, the situation did not involve “a true ‘constitutional
impasse’ or ‘actual confrontation’ between the legislative and
executive branches” because “neither vote facially required the
President to do anything or prohibited him from doing anything.” 25 In
fact, other congressional actions pointed in the opposite direction: a
proposal to require the president to withdraw American forces from
the Yugoslavian conflict also failed, and Congress later passed an
emergency supplemental appropriation for military operations there. 26
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the judgment that the congressional plaintiffs lacked
standing, although the three judges on the panel needed four opinions
to explain the result. 27
Presumably one or both houses of Congress would have standing
to challenge executive action. The Supreme Court suggested as much
unfavorable treatment as opposed to other Members of their respective
bodies.” Id. at 821 (distinguishing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486
(1969)).
21.

Id. at 830. The Supreme Court held the Line Item Veto Act
unconstitutional the following year. Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417 (1998). The Court found that the challengers, a city agency
and a group of Idaho potato farmers who challenged various
cancellations of federal expenditures under the Line Item Veto Act, had
alleged concrete and personal injuries that were sufficient to satisfy the
requirements for standing. Id. at 430, 432.

22.

Raines, 521 U.S. at 823.

23.

52 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

24.

52 F. Supp. 2d at 42–43.

25.

Id. at 43.

26.

Id. at 44.

27.

203 F.3d at 19 (Silberman, J., opinion of the court); id. at 24
(Silberman, J., concurring); id. at 28 (Randolph, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 37 (Tatel, J., concurring).
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in INS v. Chadha, 28 in which both congressional chambers intervened
to support the constitutionality of the legislative veto when the
executive branch declined to support it. The Court observed that the
House and Senate were “proper parties” to advance legal arguments
that the executive branch declined to make. 29 An institutional
decision by either or both houses might confirm the existence of the
“constitutional impasse” or “actual confrontation” between the
branches that the district court in Campbell found lacking. 30
For standing purposes, a member of the armed forces who receives
orders to report to a combat zone might well be able to challenge a
military operation. Soldiers face powerful disincentives to confront
authority, 31 but courts did find that some military personnel had
standing to challenge the legality of the Vietnam War. 32 Moreover, a
member who is prosecuted for refusing orders to participate in a
conflict would be able to assert the illegality of the operation as a
defense to charges of insubordination. 33
The Supreme Court reinforced the significance of the standing
barrier in this area in a decision rendered as this article was going to
press. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA 34 held that a group of
lawyers as well as human rights and other organizations did not have
standing to challenge the procedures for authorizing electronic
surveillance of persons outside the United States for foreignintelligence purposes. The plaintiffs had asserted legally cognizable
injuries in fact relating to their fear of having sensitive
communications monitored and the costly steps they had taken to
28.

462 U.S. 919 (1983).

29.

Id. at 930 n.5.

30.

See supra text accompanying note 25.

31.

See JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 56–57 (1993) (noting
that officers who filed suit would risk sacrificing their careers and that
enlisted personnel would be challenging authority in ways that are
fundamentally inconsistent with their training).

32.

See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 1971)
(concluding that “individual plaintiffs, particularly those serving in
Southeast Asia,” had standing even though the state did not); Berk v.
Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306 (2d Cir. 1970) (finding that a soldier ordered to
report for dispatch to South Vietnam had alleged sufficient injury to
satisfy standing and other jurisdictional requirements). But see Mottola
v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178, 179 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding that members of
the military reserve who were not under orders to report to a combat
zone lacked standing to challenge the Vietnam War).

33.

See, e.g., United States ex rel. New v. Rumsfeld, 448 F.3d 403 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (enlisted man deployed in a peacekeeping force who was
court-martialed for refusing orders to wear United Nations insignia on
his uniform).

34.

No. 11-1025 (U.S. Feb. 26, 2013).
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avoid such monitoring, 35 those injuries were caused by the
government’s surveillance policies, 36 and that their asserted injuries
could be redressed by an appropriate judicial order. 37
In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries
were “highly speculative” and rested on “a highly attenuated chain of
possibilities” and therefore were not “certainly impending.”38
Moreover, those injuries were not “fairly traceable” to the program
that the plaintiffs were challenging, 39 because the plaintiffs could
“only speculate” about whether any potential interception of their
communications would occur under the aegis of the surveillance
program at issue. 40
The Court conceded that its ruling might make it very difficult
for anyone to challenge the surveillance program but noted that this
was no basis for adopting a more permissive approach to standing.41
Even if the Court had found that the plaintiffs had standing, such a
ruling would not have resolved the legality of the intelligencegathering program underlying the litigation. 42
B.

Justiciability

Even if a plaintiff with standing were available, a court still might
decline to reach the merits of a challenge to a military or other foreign
operation under the so-called political-question doctrine. The idea
that some cases raise nonjusticiable political questions has few
scholarly defenders these days, 43 and the Supreme Court has hesitated
35.

Id. slip op. at 8.

36.

Id.

37.

Id. slip op. at 2 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

38.

Id. slip op. at 11.

39.

Id.

40.

Id. slip. op. at 14. The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ alternative
standing argument that relied on the steps that they had taken to avoid
surveillance under the program at issue. Id. slip op. at 16-19.

41.

Id. slip op. at 22 (“[t]he assumption that if respondents have no
standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find
standing.” (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 489 (1982).)

42.

Id. slip op. at 20 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (expressing “no view on the
merits of the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims”).

43.

See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Is There a “Political Question” Doctrine?, 85
YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic
Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 643 (1989); Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122
HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1193–1204 (2009). But see JESSE H. CHOPER,
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 260–379
(1980) (arguing that the courts should treat federalism and separationof-powers disputes as nonjusticiable).
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to invoke this doctrine recently. 44 Nevertheless, lower courts rejected
challenges to the legality of the Vietnam War on the basis that they
presented political questions, including cases brought by members of
Congress 45 as well as others filed by members of the armed forces and
other individuals. 46 Similarly, a lawsuit contesting the legality of
American involvement in El Salvador under President Reagan was
dismissed under the political-question doctrine. 47 Although some cases
have treated such claims as justiciable, 48 a plurality of the Supreme
Court invoked the political-question doctrine to reject a challenge to
President Carter’s unilateral termination of a defense treaty with
Taiwan. 49 Accordingly, the body of precedent relating to foreign
affairs suggests that the justiciability issue must be taken seriously.
C.

Timing

Two additional procedural hurdles, both relating to the timing of
litigation, could pose serious difficulties for anyone seeking to involve
44.

See, e.g., Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012)
(holding that the political-question doctrine does not bar judicial review
of a State Department policy against listing Israel as the birthplace of
persons born in Jerusalem); U.S. Dep’t of Commerce v. Montana, 503
U.S. 442, 456–59 (1992) (rejecting the argument that a constitutional
challenge to the statutory formula for allocating seats in the House of
Representatives was a political question); Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1986) (finding no political
question in a lawsuit challenging the executive branch’s failure to
enforce an international conservation convention); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 940–43 (1983) (holding that a challenge to a legislative veto
contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act did not involve a
political question); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (rejecting
the notion that a challenge to malapportionment of a state legislature
presented a political question). Only one recent case has relied on the
political-question doctrine. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993)
(rejecting a challenge to the Senate’s process for conducting
impeachment trials); see also Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305–06
(2004) (plurality opinion) (urging that claims of political
gerrymandering should be deemed nonjusticiable).

45.

Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973).

46.

See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1970); Head v. Nixon, 342
F. Supp. 521 (E.D. La.), aff’d mem., 468 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1972); Davi
v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 478 (W.D. Va. 1970).

47.

Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356–57 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per
curiam).

48.

See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 33–34 (1st Cir. 1971).

49.

Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart & Stevens, JJ., concurring in the
judgment).
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the judiciary in disputes relating to war powers and foreign affairs.
Cases could be filed too soon, raising questions of ripeness, or too late,
raising questions of mootness.
1.

Ripeness

In some circumstances, a plaintiff might go to court too soon,
before a legal dispute is ripe. This problem arose in Dellums v. Bush,50
where more than fifty members of Congress sought an injunction to
prevent President George H.W. Bush from initiating military
operations against Iraq during the first Persian Gulf War without
explicit congressional authorization. 51 The U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia concluded that the case did not present a
political question 52 and that the congressional plaintiffs had
standing. 53 Nevertheless, the court found the lawsuit to be premature
for two reasons: (1) because Congress had not yet taken a position
about the situation in Kuwait precipitated by an Iraqi invasion; 54 and
(2) because the president had not so clearly committed to imminent
military action that a judicial ruling was yet necessary. 55
2.

Mootness

In other circumstances, a legal challenge might come too late,
when a dispute has become moot. Burke v. Barnes, 56 a challenge to
President Reagan’s policies in Central America, illustrates this
phenomenon. This case involved a bill conditioning further U.S.
military assistance to the government of El Salvador on the
President’s certification that the Salvadoran government was making
adequate progress in improving human rights in that nation. 57 Reagan
purported to pocket veto this bill following a congressional

50.

752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).

51.

See id. at 1143 & n.1.

52.

Id. at 1145–46.

53.

Id. at 1148. In this pre-Raines v. Byrd case, the district court also
rejected suggestions that it exercise its discretion not to entertain the
case. Id. at 1148–49. For further discussion of that approach, see
Jonathan L. Entin, The Dog That Rarely Barks: Why the Courts Won’t
Resolve the War Powers Debate, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1305, 1309–
10 (1997); Sophia C. Goodman, Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss
Congressional-Plaintiff Suits: A Reassessment, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1075 (1990).

54.

Dellums, 752 F. Supp. at 1150–51.

55.

Id. at 1151–52.

56.

479 U.S. 361 (1987).

57.

Id. at 362.
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adjournment. 58 Because the bill in question had expired, its provisions
had no present effect even if it had become law after the chief
executive took no action on it within the ten-day period required by
the Constitution. 59 Accordingly, the dispute had become moot and the
case was dismissed. 60
To the extent that conflicts between Congress and the president
relating to military and foreign policy rest on legislative restrictions
on appropriations, as was the case in Burke v. Barnes, the time limits
on funding measures could make mootness an important barrier to
adjudication. But national security issues can play out in other types
of litigation. The Pentagon Papers case, for example, involved the
executive branch’s effort to prevent further publication of information
obtained from a Defense Department study of U.S. involvement in
Southeast Asia. 61 Although that case went to final judgment on the
merits, the government’s effort to suppress a magazine article about
the hydrogen bomb foundered when essentially the same information
was published elsewhere while the case was on appeal and the
government therefore abandoned its efforts against the original
article. 62

II.

DEFERENCE TO THE EXECUTIVE ON THE MERITS

Although these procedural and jurisdictional barriers to judicial
review can be overcome, those who seek to limit what they regard as
executive excess in military and foreign affairs should not count on
the judiciary to serve as a consistent ally. The Supreme Court has
shown substantial deference to the president in national security
cases. Even when the Court has rejected the executive’s position, it
generally has done so on relatively narrow grounds.
Consider the Espionage Act cases that arose during World War I.
Schenck v. United States, 63 which is best known for Justice Holmes’s
58.

Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“If any Bill shall not be
returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it
shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like
Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, by their
adjournment prevent its return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.”)).

59.

Id. at 363–64.

60.

Id. at 365.

61.

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam).

62.

United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.),
dismissed as moot, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979); see Jonathan L. Entin,
Note, United States v. Progressive, Inc.: The Faustian Bargain and the
First Amendment, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 538, 541 n.11 (1980).

63.

249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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announcement of the clear and present danger test, upheld a
conviction for obstructing military recruitment based on the
defendant’s having mailed a leaflet criticizing the military draft
although there was no evidence that anyone had refused to submit to
induction as a result. Justice Holmes almost offhandedly observed
that “the document would not have been sent unless it had been
intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could
be expected to have upon persons subject to the draft except to
influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.” 64 The circumstances
in which the speech took place affected the scope of First Amendment
protection: “When a nation is at war many things that might be said
in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance
will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could
regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” 65 A week later,
without mentioning the clear and present danger test, the Court
upheld the conviction of the publisher of a German-language
newspaper for undermining the war effort 66 and of Eugene Debs for a
speech denouncing the war. 67 Early in the following term, Justice
Holmes refined his thinking about clear and present danger while
introducing the marketplace theory of the First Amendment in
Abrams v. United States, 68 but only Justice Brandeis agreed with his
position. 69 The majority, however, summarily rejected the First
Amendment defense on the basis of Holmes’s opinions for the Court
in the earlier cases. 70
Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected challenges to the
government’s war programs during World War II. For example, the
Court rebuffed a challenge to the use of military commissions to try
German saboteurs. 71 Congress had authorized the use of military
tribunals in such cases, and the president had relied on that
authorization in directing that the defendants be kept out of civilian
courts. 72 In addition, the Court upheld the validity of the Japanese
internment program. 73 Of course, the Court did limit the scope of the
64.

Id. at 51.

65.

Id. at 52.

66.

Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919).

67.

Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919).

68.

250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).

69.

Id. at 631.

70.

Id. at 619 (citing Schenck and Frohwerk).

71.

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).

72.

Id. at 28.

73.

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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program by holding that it did not apply to “concededly loyal”
citizens. 74 But it took four decades for the judiciary to conclude that
some of the convictions that the Supreme Court had upheld during
wartime should be vacated. 75 Congress eventually passed legislation
apologizing for the treatment of Japanese Americans and authorizing
belated compensation to internees. 76
The Court never directly addressed the legality of the Vietnam
War. The Pentagon Papers case, for example, did not address how
the nation became militarily involved in Southeast Asia, only whether
the government could prevent the publication of a Defense
Department study of U.S. engagement in that region. 77 The lawfulness
of orders to train military personnel bound for Vietnam gave rise to
Parker v. Levy, 78 but the central issue in that case was the
constitutionality of the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice that were the basis of the court-martial of the Army physician
who refused to train medics who would be sent to the war zone. 79 The
few lower courts that addressed the merits of challenges to the
legality of the Vietnam War consistently rejected those challenges. 80
The picture in the post-2001 era is less clear. In three different
cases the Supreme Court has rejected the executive branch’s position,
but all of those rulings were narrow in scope. For example, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld 81 held that a U.S. citizen held as an enemy combatant must
be given a meaningful opportunity to have a neutral decision-maker
determine the factual basis for his detention. There was no majority
opinion, however, so the implications of the ruling were ambiguous to
say the least. Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion for four members
of the Court concluded that Congress had authorized the president to
detain enemy combatants by passing the Authorization for Use of
Military Force 82 and that the AUMF satisfied the statutory
requirement of congressional authorization for the detention of U.S.

74.

Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 297 (1944).

75.

See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1987);
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984).

76.

Act of Aug. 10, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 1989–1989d (2006)).

77.

See supra text accompanying note 61.

78.

417 U.S. 733 (1974).

79.

See id. at 752–61; id. at 766 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 773–74
(Stewart, J., joined by Douglas & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).

80.

See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 34 (1st Cir. 1971);
DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (2d Cir. 1971).

81.

542 U.S. 507 (2004).

82.

Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
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citizens. 83 Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, thought that the
AUMF had not in fact authorized the detention of American citizens
as required by the statute, 84 which suggested that Hamdi should be
released. But the Court would have been deadlocked as to the remedy
had he adhered to his view of how to proceed. This was because
Justices Scalia and Stevens also believed that Hamdi’s detention was
unlawful and that he should be released on habeas corpus, 85 whereas
Justice Thomas thought that the executive branch had acted within
its authority and therefore would have denied relief. 86 This alignment
left four justices in favor of a remand for more formal proceedings,
four other justices in favor of releasing Hamdi, and one justice
supporting the government’s detention of Hamdi with no need for a
more elaborate hearing. To avoid a deadlock, therefore, Justice Souter
reluctantly joined the plurality’s remand order. 87
Hamdi was atypical because that case involved a U.S. citizen who
was detained. The vast majority of detainees have been foreign
nationals. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 88 the Supreme Court ruled that
the military commissions that the executive branch had established in
the wake of the September 11 attacks had not been authorized by
Congress and therefore could not be used to try detainees. 89 A
concurring opinion made clear that the president could seek
authorization from Congress to use the type of military commissions
that had been established unilaterally in this case. 90
Congress responded to that suggestion by enacting the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, 91 which sought to endorse the executive’s
detainee policies and to restrict judicial review of detainee cases. In
Boumediene v. Bush, 92 the Supreme Court again rejected the
government’s position. First, the statute did not suspend the writ of
83.

18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006); see 542 U.S. at 517 (plurality opinion of
O’Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy & Breyer, JJ.).

84.

542 U.S. at 545 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).

85.

Id. at 573–74 (Scalia, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).

86.

Id. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

87.

Id. at 553 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).

88.

548 U.S. 557 (2006).

89.

Id. at 593–94.

90.

Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., joined by Kennedy, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ.,
concurring).

91.

Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§§ 948a–950w (Supp. V 2011)).

92.

553 U.S. 723 (2008).
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habeas corpus. 93 Second, the statutory procedures for hearing cases
involving detainees were constitutionally inadequate. 94 At the same
time, the Court emphasized that the judiciary should afford some
deference to the executive branch in dealing with the dangers of
terrorism 95 and should respect the congressional decision to
consolidate judicial review of detainee cases in the District of
Columbia Circuit. 96
Detainees who have litigated in the lower federal courts in the
District of Columbia have not found a sympathetic forum. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has not upheld a single district
court ruling that granted any sort of relief to detainees, and the
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in every post-Boumediene
detainee case in which review was sought. 97 In only one case involving
a detainee has the D.C. Circuit granted relief, and that case came up
from a military commission following procedural changes adopted in
the wake of Boumediene. 98 About a month after this symposium took
place, in Hamdan v. United States 99 the court overturned a conviction
for providing material support for terrorism. The defendant was the
same person who successfully challenged the original military
commissions in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 100 This very recent ruling
emphasized that the statute under which he was prosecuted did not
apply to offenses committed before its enactment. 101 It remains to be
seen how broadly the decision will apply.
93.

Id. at 771.

94.

Id. at 795.

95.

Id. at 796–97.

96.

Id. at 795–96.

97.

See Latif v. Obama, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2741 (2012); Al-Merfedi v. Obama, 654 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012); Uthman v. Obama, 637 F.3d 400 (D.C.
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2739 (2012); Salahi v. Obama, 625
F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C.
Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011); Bensayah v. Obama,
610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509 (D.C.
Cir. 2009).

98.

See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII,
123 Stat. 2190, 2574–614 (codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a, 948h, 948q,
949p-1, 949s, 950a, 950p (Supp. V 2011)).

99.

696 F.3d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 2012).

100. See supra notes 88–90 and accompanying text.
101. Hamdan, 696 F.3d at 1241, 1247. Hamdan was prosecuted under the
Military Commissions Act of 2006, see supra note 91 and accompanying
text, some of the procedural provisions of which were rejected in
Boumediene, see supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. The
substantive provisions of the statute were not at issue and remained
intact after Boumediene. In its recent ruling, the D.C. Circuit sought to
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Meanwhile, other challenges to post-2001 terrorism policies also
have failed, and the Supreme Court has declined to review those
rulings as well. For example, the lower courts have rebuffed claims
asserted by foreign nationals who were subject to extraordinary
rendition. In Arar v. Ashcroft, 102 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of constitutional and statutory
challenges brought by a plaintiff holding dual citizenship in Canada
and the United States. 103 And in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan,
Inc., 104 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
state-secrets privilege barred a separate challenge to extraordinary
rendition brought by citizens of Egypt, Morocco, Ethiopia, Iraq, and
Yemen. 105 Unlike Arar, in which the defendants were federal
officials, 106 this case was filed against a private corporation that
allegedly assisted in transporting the plaintiffs to overseas locations
where they were subjected to torture. 107 Although at least four judges
on the en banc courts dissented from both rulings, 108 the Supreme
Court declined to review either case. 109

III. THE BENEFITS OF POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF
INTERBRANCH DISPUTES
Whatever the merits of the decisions discussed in the previous
section, those rulings should give pause to those who might rely on
avoid any constitutional infirmities that might arise under the Ex Post
Facto Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, by narrowly construing the
scope of the 2006 statute so as to exclude conduct that occurred before
its passage. The conduct that gave rise to the charges against Hamdan
occurred between 1996 and 2001. 696 F.3d at 1241.
102. 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409
(2010).
103. The complicity of Canadian authorities in Arar’s rendition created
widespread criticism and a shakeup of that country’s policies for dealing
with suspected terrorists. See Colin Freeze, In Wake of Arar, RCMP
Beef Up Oversight, GLOBE & MAIL, June 17, 2010, at A13.
104. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442
(2011).
105. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1074–75.
106. Arar, 585 F.3d at 567.
107. Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1075.
108. Arar was a 7–4 ruling. See 585 F.3d at 562. The vote in Mohamed was
6–5. See 614 F.3d at 1073, 1093.
109. See supra notes 102 & 104 (citing the denial of certiorari in both cases).
For criticism of these decisions, see Daniel Joseph Natalie, Note, No
Longer Secret: Overcoming the State Secrets Doctrine to Explore
Meaningful Remedies for Victims of Extraordinary Rendition, 62 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1237 (2012).
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the judiciary as a check on what they regard as executive
overreaching. When combined with the procedural and jurisdictional
obstacles discussed in Part I, a more general lesson emerges: the
judiciary cannot resolve all the questions that might arise in
connection with war powers and foreign affairs. Nonetheless, the
substantive and procedural limitations of judicial review provide an
opportunity for greater civic and political engagement in decisions
that can have profound consequences for our nation and the world.
If the courts cannot resolve these matters, questions of war and
diplomacy, it should come as no surprise that they are getting worked
out largely through political accommodation and negotiation. These
accommodations and negotiations necessarily reflect the differing
constitutional views of the legislative and executive branches as well
as of the persons and groups that engage on these issues. Although
many lament the quality of current political discourse, excessive
reliance on the judicial process has undesirable consequences. The
Supreme Court has had difficulty rendering consistent or principled
decisions about legislative-executive relationships. 110 Sometimes the
Court has taken a formalistic approach that emphasizes the need to
maintain clear lines between the branches. 111 At other times, the
Court has used a functional approach that emphasizes the importance
of checks and balances to prevent the accumulation of excessive power
in any particular branch. 112 In other words, judicial review does not
always provide clear answers to complex questions.
The complexity of those questions is particularly evident in the
military and diplomatic arenas. Reliance on the political process
recognizes the uncertainties and contingencies involved in many of

110. See generally Jonathan L. Entin, Separation of Powers, the Political
Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 186–
212 (1990).
111. E.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (holding that Congress may
not assign executive functions to the Comptroller General because that
official is subject to removal by Congress even though no Comptroller
General had been removed or even threatened with removal since the
position was created); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (invalidating
the legislative veto because disapproval of agency decisions required
Congress to pass a bill that complies with the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Article I, section 7 of the Constitution).
112. E.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding the validity of
the independent counsel as a mechanism for investigating and
prosecuting serious criminal conduct by high-level executive officials on
the theory that the Department of Justice, as part of the executive
branch, might have a conflict of interest in such matters); Humphrey’s
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding a limitation on
the President’s ability to remove a member of an independent agency).
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these matters. 113 Moreover, interbranch negotiation rather than
litigation recognizes that an effective government requires a degree of
comity that is inconsistent with frequent reliance on the judiciary.114
Our system rests on a rich set of subtle understandings and an
implicit sense of political limits. 115 As a result, structural and
institutional factors often dampen the inevitable conflicts that arise
between Congress and the president. Excessive reliance on the
judiciary tends to raise the stakes of conflict by clearly identifying
winners and losers and by encouraging the assertion of extreme
positions for short-term litigation advantage that might complicate
the resolution of future disagreements. 116
In addition, the litigation process takes time. Of course, the
Pentagon Papers case was resolved in less than three weeks after the
New York Times published its first article on the subject.117
Ordinarily, however, the judicial process proceeds at a much statelier
pace. Consider another landmark case, albeit one that dealt with
domestic issues. Cooper v. Aaron 118 was decided approximately one
year after President Eisenhower dispatched federal troops to enforce
the desegregation of Little Rock Central High School in the face of
massive resistance encouraged by Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus.119
Often, disputes over military and diplomatic matters are timesensitive. Expedited judicial review might help, but events on the
ground might well frustrate orderly judicial disposition.

*****
Let me close with some points of clarification. Although I am
skeptical about the value of judicial review of disputes about war
powers and foreign affairs, I do not advocate that they be treated as
political questions and therefore outside the purview of the courts. I
offer no doctrinal bright lines for determining which cases should be
resolved on the merits through litigation. Nor, in advocating less
113. See Jonathan L. Entin, Congress, the President, and the Separation of
Powers: Rethinking the Value of Litigation, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 51
(1991).
114. See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(1972).

AND THE

CONSTITUTION 108–16

115. See Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 371, 391 (1976).
116. See Entin, supra note 113, at 52–53.
117. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 753 (1971)
(Harlan, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(lamenting the “frenzied train of events” leading to the decision).
118. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
119. See id. at 4 (summarizing the chronology of events in court); id. at 11–
12 (summarizing the chronology of events in Little Rock).
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reliance on lawsuits, do I exaggerate the quality of political discourse
in the United States. But that is hardly a new concern. More than a
century ago the legendary Chicago saloonkeeper, Mr. Dooley,
observed that “politics ain’t beanbag.” 120 Some things never change.
I end as I began. We cannot count on the legal process to resolve
the debate about war powers and foreign affairs. Many potential
lawsuits will founder on the shoals of jurisdiction and procedure. And
for those who believe that the executive has accumulated excessive
power in these fields, the judicial record of modesty and deference
militates against relying on the courts to rein in the president. In
short, most of the time we must leave issues of war and foreign affairs
largely to our politicians.

120. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY: IN PEACE AND IN WAR xiii (1898).
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